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The Consequences of Anonymous
Access to the Financial Payments
System*
Richard T. Preiss**
I.

Introduction

Rapid advances in technology have conferred vast benefits
upon modern societies. Money can be wire transferred in an
instant. The Internet has dispensed with the need to send faxes
across telephone wires. The days when one was required to carry
multiple currencies to travel across international borders have all
but disappeared. The day is fast approaching when societies will
be cashless and we will be able to carry so-called smart cards1 that
contain all of our funds in the form of electronic cash. Smart cards
have the technical ability to facilitate transfers of electronic cash
from one smart card to another. We can use electronic cash to
shop on the Internet and even gamble there if we wish. The shares
of a company could be bought and sold on multiple stock exchanges through electronic cash transactions. When the London stock
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1. The term "smart card" as used in this paper means an electronic card with
stored value in the form of electronic cash that can be used to access both national
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its owner to purchase or sell goods and services, including electronic cash, without
the use of physical cash or checks.
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exchange is closed, for example, a person in the United Kingdom
might transmit electronic cash to New York and buy publiclytraded shares because the stock exchanges in New York will be
open. If a citizen of one country loses faith in the national
currency, he might use an electronic cash transaction to convert his
assets into the stronger currency of another country in a foreign
bank account. The examples of how modern technology will
continue to benefit us are numerous.
These benefits come with costs and present new challenges for
law enforcement worldwide. One cost is that the new technology
can be used to facilitate economic crime in both the domestic and
international arenas. Criminals long ago learned that governments
must observe borders, while criminals can ignore them with
impunity.
This article begins with a description of an international bank
fraud case that was tried in Manhattan and describes how traditional bank records enabled the prosecution to prove its case. It
focuses on some of the issues that arise when modern technology
is used by criminals and the challenges thereby presented to law
enforcement. It also examines some of the consequences of
payments systems that grant individuals anonymous access to those
systems2 The article presents proposals for regulating the issuance
and use of smart cards or any other stored cash value card
available for general use in a financial payments system. 3 It
concludes with the recommendation that anonymous access to any
financial payments system for the payment or receipt of large
amounts of funds should be barred to all individuals and institutions.
II.

An Example of Bank Fraud

On February 19, 1997, a trial jury in Manhattan convicted
three members of a family that operated banks in Puerto Rico,
Panama, the Dominican Republic and Venezuela of various bank

2. The financial payments system includes both the domestic and international bank payments system and the ability to purchase or sell goods, services and
currency.
3. An open payments system is one where the smart card or stored cash
value card can be used anywhere to purchase or sell goods and services, including
the ability to encode the smart card with electronic cash.
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fraud and larceny charges. The writer was the lead prosecutor for
this trial, which took more than three months to complete.4
A grand jury in Manhattan had indicted the three defendants5
on evidence that millions of dollars had been stolen from their
Puerto Rican bank and used to prop up two of their other banks.
Further, the grand jury charged that the three defendants had
schemed to defraud depositors of their Puerto Rican bank of
millions more by misrepresenting both the quality of that bank
where the deposits were supposed to be located and the very
location of some of those deposits.
The crimes committed were truly international crimes. Most
of the depositor-victims were Venezuelan nationals and few had
ever set foot in Manhattan. Their money was supposedly placed in
Puerto Rican and Panamanian banks; the deposits were funneled
to Puerto Rico through New York and Miami banks. Virtually all
of the money transfers were accomplished by means of electronic
wire transfers or checks that were processed in Manhattan. Some
of the money ultimately stolen was used to prop up Dominican and
Venezuelan institutions.
Modern technology, albeit "low tech," assisted the Manhattan
prosecutors in proving their case.
Printouts from computers,
microfilmed copies of account statements, checks, Swift messages,
and the miracle of the copying machine allowed the prosecutors to
show the jury exactly what had happened in the international and
domestic bank payments system in Manhattan.
In fact, the
prosecutors were able to show that one of the defrauded depositors
who lived in Venezuela opened a checking account at a Citibank
branch a few blocks from the courthouse where the case was tried.
That depositor used a check drawn on his account at that Citibank
branch to open his account at the defendants' bank in Puerto Rico.
Paper documents were available to trace the funds of that depositor
and others through the banking system and to show the trial jury
that the transactions actually took place in Manhattan and that the

4. The case was tried by three assistant district attorneys, Joseph J. Dawson,
Jonathan E. Feigelson, and the writer. The names of the three defendants were
Orlando Castro Lianes, Orlando Castro Castro, and Jorge Castro Barredo.
5. People v. Castro et al., New York County Supreme Court Indictment

Number 2459/96.
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legal requirements of New York law had been satisfied.6 Since it
was all on paper for the jury to see, justice was done.
III. The Paperless Bank Fraud Case In Cyberspace
The prosecutors had a difficult time proving their case because,
aside from certain transactions being processed in Manhattan,
everything else took place in other jurisdictions, and the international bank payments system is quite complex and very difficult to
understand. However, they had the documentary evidence and
witnesses from New York financial institutions to prove that the
transactions clearly attributable to the defendants' actions in
Manhattan amounted to the thefts and obtaining of property from
the various victims. While achieving a conviction was not an easy
task, it is clear that in the cyberspace age it will be even more
difficult to prove an international bank fraud case.
In cyberspace there will be no paper documents. There will be
no account statements to help illuminate for a judge or jury what
a prosecutor means when it is asserted that money went from Point
A to Point B or from Person A to Person B. There may not even
be bank accounts to prove the point that, when money is stolen or
obtained by fraud from a person or business, it goes from one place
to another.
In the coming age of smart cards and cashless societies, bank
accounts, as they presently exist, may become obsolete. It is costly
to acquire, process, and store paper, and it is expensive to retrieve.
Indeed, those costs provide much of the motivation to dispense
with paper in the first place. In the future, when a consumer needs
only a computer and a secret code to pay his bills and move his
money, he will have little incentive, and no inclination, to pay a
bank to maintain records he already keeps on a hard drive or
diskette at his home or office.
The day is fast approaching when anyone with money will be
able to go to a street corner kiosk and purchase a form of swipe
card encoded with electronic cash that can be used anywhere in the
world. Already in New York City and other cities with mass transit
systems, customers can go to a store or kiosk and purchase a
Metrocard encoded with electronic cash that can be used to ride

6. The relevant statutes are the New York Criminal Procedure Law
[§§ 20.20(1)(a) and 20.40(1)(a)] and the Penal Law [§ 20.00]. In essence, these
statutes provide that if one element of a charged crime occurs within the state,
New York courts have jurisdiction to hear the case and punish the offender in the
event of a conviction.
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the transit system. It is impossible to trace these cards because
they can be purchased and used by anyone, without identification.
It is only a short step from this scenario to one where consumers
carry such cards for a range of purposes far wider in scope than
riding trains. Future workers may be paid with electronic cash
cards, instead of checks or wire transfers deposited into a bank
account. What will stop drug dealers or fraudsters from placing illgotten gains on smart cards containing electronic cash and sending
the cards out of the country? Such technology may very well
eliminate the one advantage that law enforcement agencies now
possess in the war against narco-launderers-the drug dealer's
heavy burden of moving vast amounts of bulky currency across
borders, or depositing those funds in bank accounts, without
arousing suspicion. Clearly, advances in technology will lessen the
criminals' burden of having to launder ill-gotten gains. Instead of
lugging suitcases laden with currency onto an airplane, launderers
will simply slip smart cards into shirt or skirt pockets and move vast
sums with little effort or risk of detection.
How will law enforcement officials trace transactions on such
cards when they have no bank account statements to examine?
What will the prosecutors show the jurors and judges when bank
fraud scenarios are repeated, as they surely will be? How will a
prosecutor in any jurisdiction show the trier of fact that a financial
transaction took place within the prosecutor's jurisdiction? How
will any trier of fact be able to conceptualize an electronic transfer
of funds if there is no paper to display and it is unclear where a
transaction actually took place? Will electronic transactions be
deemed to have taken place elsewhere from everywhere? When the
effort is made by a prosecutor to pinpoint jurisdiction and venue,
will the defense inevitably argue the transaction should be deemed
to have taken place somewhere else?
IV. Smart Card Technology And Money Laundering Regulation
The national law of countries is very important in combatting
international economic crime. A country whose laws do not keep
up with changes in the international economy or that does not

outlaw money laundering is virtually inviting criminal activity
within its borders.
It is difficult enough for the law enforcement officials of
individual countries with modern money laundering laws to stay
abreast of technological developments and the benefits they confer
upon criminals. The authorities are often too far behind the
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criminals when it comes to technological sophistication. Add an
international dimension to a case and there are even more
obstacles to be confronted. The prosecutors in the Manhattan bank
fraud case discussed earlier were fortunate because they received

the cooperation of the foreign governments in those countries
where critical evidence was found. Such, however, is not always
the case and law enforcement officers often experience serious
difficulties in obtaining evidence. If law enforcement agencies are

having trouble now, it is not difficult to imagine what awaits if the
smart card with its capacity to allow "purse to purse" transfers
gains wide acceptance.
Like many other countries, the United States has enacted a
comprehensive system of regulation designed to combat money
laundering.

The dominant regulatory weapon against money

laundering in the United States is the Bank Secrecy Act.7

It

requires, inter alia, that financial institutions file a Currency

Transaction Report (CTR) for cash transactions of more than ten
thousand dollars within the United States. 8 It also requires anyone

carrying more than ten thousand dollars in cash (including foreign
currency) or any kind of financial instruments into or out of the
United States to report that fact to the government at the border.9
In 1986 the United States Congress enacted the Anti Drug
Abuse Act, which outlawed both money laundering" and the
structuring of transactions for the purpose of evading the requirement to report currency dealings that exceed ten thousand
dollars.11 That Act was amended by the Drug Abuse Act of 1988

and strengthened the United States' effort to restrict money
laundering.12 It is fair to say that United States money laundering
laws are the strictest in the world.

7. Amendments to the Federal Deposit Insurance Act Titles I and III, Pub.
L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114-1124 (1970).
8. Id. at 31 U.S.C. §§ 5313 and 5324 (1988). The implementing regulations
in 31 C.F.R § 103.11(g) define a financial institution very broadly. Moreover, 26
U.S.C. § 6050(l) generally requires persons engaged in a trade or business who do
not come within the definitions of a financial institution to file the equivalent of
a CTR with the government each time they engage in a transaction, or series of
transactions, which involves more than ten thousand dollars in currency.
9. Bank Secrecy Act, at 31 U.S.C. § 5316.
10. The Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, §§ 13511367, 100 Stat. 3207, 3218-39 (codified at 18 U.S.C 33 1956-57) makes it a federal
crime to launder proceeds from specified unlawful activity. Sections of the Money
Laundering Control Act appear in 12, 18 and 31 of the United States Code.
11. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956-57 (1987).
12. Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988).
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The entire system of anti-money laundering legislation in the
United States is premised on the notion that financial transactions
will generate records that can be examined by law enforcement
officials conducting a criminal investigation or prosecution. Those
records might be in the form of paper or they might be stored in
a computer, but they will be records of financial transactions
nevertheless. Stated another way, the regulations place a name and
other identifying information with a transaction and make it
difficult for anyone to engage in large cash or cash-equivalent
transactions within the bank payments system in an anonymous
manner. United States money laundering laws make it more
difficult, expensive and dangerous for criminals of all sorts to
launder their profits. Criminals must go to extreme lengths to

launder their monies.13

They must use runners, corrupt accoun-

tants and other paid accomplices to assist them in laundering the
cash they generate. And if they are apprehended by law enforcement, the penalties for violation of the money laundering laws are
severe.14 That said, and even without considering the advent of

the electronic cash smart card, it is doubtful that law enforcement
agencies in the United States uncover more than a small quantity
of the money laundered in the United States. Notwithstanding the
commitment of significant law enforcement resources, money

13. Recent events in New York City demonstrate the lengths to which drug
dealers will go to launder their trafficking proceeds. A joint federal, state and city
task force called the El Dorado Task Force, found that over $1.3 billion a year was
being wire transferred to Colombia through storefront money service transmitters
located in Queens, a borough of the City of New York. N.Y. NEWSDAY, June 23,
1997, at A3. Using 1990 census data, the Task Force determined that while the
average immigrant family from Colombia earned $27,000.00 per year before taxes,
the average Colombian family would have to send $50,000.00 a year to Colombia
to account for the flow of $1.3 billion. Id. A Geographic Targeting Order (GTO)
by the United States Treasury Department was issued that regulated the thousands
of businesses that wire transfer money outside the United States. Statement of
General Barry R. McCaffrey, Director, Office of National Drug Control Policy
(March 11, 1997), Before the Subcomm. on General Oversight and Investigations,
House Banking and Finance Committee. The GTO regulations required all New
York money service businesses to report all cash wire transactions to Colombia
over $750.00 (instead of the normal $10,000 threshold set forth in the federal
money laundering statutes) and submit copies of picture identity cards of those
involved. Id. Federal officials report that the Queens money service business dried
up and seizures of smuggled cash at Kennedy Airport are up an astounding 900%.
Id. While perhaps cynical, it is only a question of time before launderers find
another way to move ill-gotten gains out of the country.
14. There are civil penalties for violation of the money laundering prohibitions
along with criminal penalties including substantial fines and imprisonment for up
to ten years if a violation is willful. 31 U.S.C § 5311 (1988).
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laundering remains a major problem in the United States and other
countries.
Assuming that the smart card attains widespread acceptance, 5
it will undermine the entire system of anti-money laundering

regulation in the United States and those countries that have
enacted similar record-sensitive legislation.

Stated simply, there

will be no records. The coming system of electronic cash and
internet communication provides the money launderer with what
he craves most-anonymity. Electronic cash cards will eliminate
the record trail that law enforcement uses to apprehend money

launderers. To whatever extent money laundering is a problem
now, it will be far worse in the future age of electronic cash and
anonymous Internet communication.
V.

Proposed Solutions

The advent of the smart card means cheaper access to financial
payment systems and elimination of the vast store of paper records
inherent in the use of credit and debit cards and checks. With
those advances, however, comes a more sinister problem. That is

that smart cards will provide criminals with anonymous access to
both domestic and international payment systems. It is that aspect

of its utility that cries out for regulation by governments.
The writer has argued previously that those countries providing
financial haven for the money launderers because of bank secrecy
laws should be barred from the international bank payments

system. Concerted action by the major industrialized countries of
the world could achieve the necessary reforms. 6 In the smart
card context, the argument is much the same-smart card and

electronic cash issuers must not permit anonymous and untraceable
access to any payments system, whether domestic or international,

15. It is not at all clear that the smart card will gain acceptance by the average
consumer, although Mastercard is already advertising that its services include smart
cards along with credit and debit cards. Most people who carry credit cards and
bank debit cards do so for a very good reason-they do not wish to carry large
amounts of cash with the attendant risk of loss. In its purest form, the smart card
concept not only dispenses with physical cash, it also eliminates the need for a
bank account and enables its owner to carry all of his assets, including his cash, on
one small card in his wallet. It is at least questionable whether anyone would wish
to risk the loss of everything in exchange for the ability to carry only one card
and/or dispense with the need for a bank account.
16. Richard T. Preiss, Privacy of FinancialInformation and Civil Rights Issues:
The Implicationsfor Investigatingand ProsecutingInternationalEconomic Crime,
14 DICK. J. INT'L L. 525, 539 (1996).
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and appropriate pressures should be initiated to create such limitations-sooner rather than later.
The United States, for example, should not allow modern
technology to undermine its comprehensive system of money
laundering regulation. It should continue to bar anonymous access
to the financial payment system by enacting appropriate legislation
that requires at least the same sorts of identification that present
laws require for the conduct of traditional financial transactions.
That legislation should also apply the ten thousand dollar threshold-reporting requirement 17 for currency transactions to smart card
electronic cash transactions. It should also consider lowering that
threshold significantly if smart card technology gains wide acceptance. Finally, new legislation should prohibit "smart card to smart
card" unrecorded transfers"8 of electronic cash that will not leave
an audit trail. Failure to enact this kind of legislation virtually
guarantees that the money launderers will take advantage of this
new technology and undermine the present system of money
laundering legislation.
No country is immune to the kinds of mischief that are sure to
arise with the advent of unregulated smart cards and the absence
of audit trails. The governments of the world have a shared
interest in preventing the money launderer from doing his dirty
business in anonymity, whether his activities abet drug dealing,
fraud, theft or tax evasion. But the United States- whose citizens
collectively constitute the world's largest consumer of narcotics-has the most incentive to battle money laundering and has the
greatest interest in barring the use of any instrument or technology
that provides money launderers with anonymous access to a
financial payments system.
The United States should amend its bank regulatory and
money laundering laws to eliminate the legal possession or use of
any smart card that does not identify the user/owner of the card.
This is hardly an unprecedented notion. For instance, we would
never permit anyone to drive without first obtaining a driver's
license issued in his or her name, containing an address, and often
having a photograph as well. We should not allow anyone to
"drive" into a public financial payments system without similar
identification. Various scenarios come to mind.

17. See supra notes 9-11.
18. These are the so-called "purse to purse" transfers of electronic cash that
allow the transfer of funds from one smart card to another.
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The idea that anyone can approach a kiosk owner, give him
huge amounts of cash and receive in exchange a card containing a
corresponding amount of electronic cash is offensive. No industrialized country allows unidentified and unregulated persons to
engage in banking activity. Certainly, a kiosk owner should not be
permitted to act as a de facto banker with the power to convert
paper money to electronic cash.
Some might suggest the best solution is a total ban on the use
of smart cards. While that approach might have the virtue of
simplicity, it hardly amounts to a fair or effective solution. After all,
entire societies should not be foreclosed from using a convenient
payment system merely because small but powerful criminal groups
are likely to exploit and abuse one feature of that system. Simply
put, one does not throw the baby out with the bath water; we must
keep the child but clean the bathtub. The fundamental problem
with electronic payment systems is the anonymity it provides to
criminal users. The other features associated with these systems,
including their built-in efficiencies, more than justify outright
rejection of the notion that smart cards and electronic cash systems
should be banned.
Others might suggest linking the card to some bank account
within the jurisdiction where the card was issued or the card user
resides. It is submitted that such a requirement comes close to the
correct solution. This approach recognizes the virtues of smart
cards but is narrowly tailored to meet the anonymity problem.
Such a requirement would allow application of traditional "know
your customer" rules to financial institutions that issue smart cards
and provide records that could be used in a criminal investigation
or prosecution.
Still another approach would be for governments to issue
smart cards just as they issue currency, identity cards, passports,
social security cards and taxpayer identification numbers. The
cards issued could be electronically encoded at their point of
issuance to the consumer with pedigree information for the user,
including his name, address, social security number, and a password.
It is submitted that the best solution to the problem of
anonymous entry into both domestic and international bank
payments systems is a combination of the last two approaches
discussed-linking smart cards to a bank account and requiring the
issuing bank to maintain retrievable records of their use. The
government would supervise their issuance-just as governments
traditionally have supervised banking activity generally-by spot
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check audits of both a bank's issuance and record keeping
procedures.
The proposal here is to eliminate from commercial use any
smart card issued by any business other than a bank. The issuing
bank might charge a fee for issuing the smart card or the bank
might issue the card for no charge to reflect the cost savings in not
sending monthly statements to the customer as well as other paper
handling costs. The market will determine the cost of smart cards.
But the issuing bank would be required to maintain retrievable
records of the smart card's use by the customer. If the cardholder
desires a monthly statement, he can pay the bank a fee.
Before issuing a smart card, a bank would get to "know the
customer" by requiring a personal meeting at the bank, examining
the customer's documentation such as a driver's license, passport
and other identifying documents and creating an electronically
stored record of this information.
After issuing the smart card, the bank would keep a computerized record of all transactions on the card, including purchases of
goods and services, the purchase of electronic cash, and deposits of
electronic cash onto the smart card, with the date and location of
those transactions.
Such a system has many advantages.
First, it will eliminate the law enforcement problem of
anonymous issuance and use of the smart card. While it will still
be possible to present false identity documents to obtain a smart
card, it will be difficult, especially if photographic identification
documents are required. Moreover, banks will keep a computerized and retrievable record of the smart card's use, something that
banks now have the expertise to do and to do efficiently. A bank
can simply scan the identity documents and store them in a
computer to be retrieved when necessary. Thus when the money
launderer, fraudster or thief uses the card to commit crime, the
record will be available to support a prosecution.
Second, the proposal has the advantage of making the
fraudulent use of the smart card more difficult. It is only a
question of time before the fraudsters are able to produce fraudulent smart cards encoded with "counterfeit" identities and electronic cash, just as has been done with credit cards. With the flick of
an electronic switch on a computer, these altered smart cards can
be deactivated instantly as soon as they are inserted into an
electronic terminal.
Third, traditional notions of financial privacy can be easily
applied to the customer's records of purchases and use. The law
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can continue to require that before law enforcement achieves
access to an individual's smart card account, an appropriate
subpoena or court order must be obtained.1 9
Fourth, a smart card's use can be monitored for suspicious
account activity just as bank computers now monitor the traditional
bank account for smurfing ° and other nefarious activity. The
computers can be programmed to monitor the smart card account
and provide an alert that criminal conduct may be afoot. Present
law already requires banks to alert law enforcement of suspicious
activity in traditional bank accounts.
Fifth, the legal requirement that banks report cash transactions
of more than ten thousand dollars to the government can be easily
applied to electronic cash transactions in the same amount.
Moreover, a smart card holder who takes cash in that amount into
or out of the United States can be required by law to insert the
smart card into an electronic terminal at the border before leaving
or entering the United States just as an airline passenger must now
present his passport under the same circumstances. A computerized and retrievable record of the electronic cash on the smart card
will be created instantly.
Finally, the United States (and other countries as they see fit)
should enact legislation that prohibits the use of any smart card
that does not comply with the proposed legislation. The law should
require that the domestic electronic terminals reject such nonqualified smart cards. After all, it would make no sense to impose
these requirements for smart cards issued. and operable in the
United States only to have a non-complying smart card issued
elsewhere used to access its financial payment system anonymously.
19. The United States has financial privacy laws that generally limit access by
the government to an individual's account in a financial institution absent a court
order. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 3402 (1995). A prosecutor must obtain a subpoena,
either from a grand jury or from a court, and the financial institution must provide
the demanded evidence under pain of contempt and its accompanying sanctions.
Id. The prosecutor who obtains the evidence by grand jury subpoena is not
permitted, and is indeed forbidden, to make public disclosure of such evidence
unless authorized by law. See, e.g., Fed. R. Crim. Proc. 6(e); N.Y. Crim. Proc. L.
§ 190.25(4) (providing that grand jury proceedings are secret); N.Y. Penal L.
§ 215.70 (providing that unlawful grand jury disclosure is a felony). If the
prosecutor obtains a court subpoena calling for the production of the evidence, a
protective order might be issued or a statute might limit what use can be made of
the materials. See, e.g., N.Y. Crim. Proc. L. § 240.50. That usually means the
prosecutor may disclose it only in public court proceedings.
20. Smurfing is the structuring of a single currency transaction into multiple
transactions of less than ten thousand dollars each to avoid a currency transaction
reporting requirement. This practice is outlawed by 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1).
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After all, the United States has as much right to bar anonymous
smart card holders from its financial payments system as does any
country to regulate the conduct of persons present within its
borders.
It is not suggested that adoption of these proposals will put an
end to money laundering any more than has present money
laundering legislation. Inevitably, criminals will find ways around
any regulatory scheme and it will come as no surprise when
criminals manage to corrupt smart card technology for their own
purposes. Adoption of these proposals will, however, make it
costly, difficult and dangerous for criminal organizations to use the
financial payments system to launder their criminal proceeds.
Furthermore, it will continue to give law enforcement at least a
fighting chance to detect and prosecute criminal activity in the
financial payments system.
VI. Conclusion
Governments cannot afford to make it any easier for the
money launderer or criminals generally to dispose and make use of
their ill-gotten gains. A smart card or stored value card that
enables anyone to bypass the traditional, record-sensitive financial
payments system will make it easier for criminals to do business,
both domestically and internationally. Simply stated, legalized
anonymous entry into or use of the financial payments system must
never come to pass.
The proposal presented is a compromise representing a

balance of competing interests. Banks seek to avoid the significant
expense of maintaining paper records and strive to make the

payments system more efficient. Their legitimate interest is to
maximize profit by minimizing expense. Consumers, of course,
have a legitimate interest in exploiting the convenience that smart
cards can provide. Smart card issuers and retail merchants plainly
have an interest in attending to the needs of consumers and
profiting from their provision of these services. On the other hand,
law enforcement agencies should not be forced to surrender one of

the few advantages that they possess in the war against money
laundering and crime generally: the availability and use of retriev-

able financial records for proof of criminal activity. The proposal
set forth in this paper is a reasonable accommodation of competing
interests, while continuing legitimate limitations upon criminal
commerce in financial payment systems.

